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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE HANSON NOBLE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 20401 
V. GLEN NOBLE, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
STRONG POLICY REASONS FOR RETENTION OF 
INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL 
TORTS OUTWEIGH COUNTERVAILING POLICY FOR ITS 
ELIMINATION, AND IT SHOULD THEREFORE REMAIN 
INTACT. 
POINT I. 
STOKER V. STOKER DOES NOT ABROGATE INTER-
SPOUSAL IMMUNITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL TORTS. 
Appellant contends that the doctrine of interspousal 
immunity for unintentional torts was eliminated in the case of 
Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980). That argument is 
based on the fact that the Court did not distinguish in that 
case between intentional and unintentional torts for purposes 
of interspousal immunity. Appellant's Brief, at 26. 
The case of Stoker v. Stoker involved a wife's suit for 
damages against her former husband for injuries he had inten-
tionally inflicted prior to their divorce. 616 P.2d at 90. 
Therefore, the issue before the Court was whether interspousal 
immunity existed for intentional torts. The Court did not have 
before it either the facts or the issue of interspousal 
immunity in an unintentional tort scenario. Therefore, in 
stating that interspousal immunity no longer existed, the Court 
was making such declaration based on the facts and issue before 
it. 
Additionally, the Court supported its decision by rationale 
set forth in Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 
(1954), which also addressed the issue of interspousal immunity 
for intentional torts. In Taylor, this Court stated that minor 
instances of intentional contact should not be actionable but 
that neither husband nor wife "consents to intentionally 
inflicted serious personal injuries by the other." 275 P.2d at 
699. The Court reaffirmed its decision in Taylor v. Patten 
which did not address interspousal immunity for unintentional 
torts. The Court's reliance on that case and reaffirmance of 
it, especially in light of the facts in Stoker, strongly sug-
gest the narrowness of the Court's focus. 
Moreover, this Court in Stoker v. Stoker addressed its 
rationale set forth in Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 
384 P.2d 389 (1963), wherein the Court had discussed whether 
the Married Women's Act proscribed a wife from suing her 
husband in tort. In reaffirming Taylor v. Patten, this Court 
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in Stoker simply held that the Married Women's Act allowed a 
wife to sue her husband for intentional torts committed prior 
to their divorce. 616 P.2d at 591; Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 
1288, 1290 (Utah 1983). This Court in Stoker did not address, 
let alone overrule, the strong policy reasons set forth in 
Rubalcava for maintaining interspousal immunity for uninten-
tional torts. 
Finally, subsequent decisions of this Court have shown that 
Stoker was intended to eliminate interspousal immunity only for 
intentional torts. See Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1230 
(Utah 1983) (citing Stoker v. Stoker: "Confirming wife's right 
to an action against her husband for the intentional infliction 
of personal injuries"); Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Utah 
1983) (citing Stoker v. Stoker: "That case held that the 
legislature had abolished that common law doctrine [inter-
spousal immunity] insofar as it barred a wife's action for 
personal injuries intentionally inflicted upon her by her 
husband prior to their divorce"); Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 
864, 865 n.5 (Utah 1981) ("[In Stoker,] [t]his court declined 
to apply the doctrine [of interspousal immunity] in an inten-
tional tort case"). 
The foregoing discussion shows that Stoker recognized that 
the Legislature had abolished interspousal immunity only 
"insofar as it barred a wife's action for personal injuries 
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intentionally inflicted upon her by her husband prior to their 
divorce." Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d at 1290. 
POINT II. 
STRONG POLICY REASONS EXIST FOR THE RETEN-
TION OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY FOR UNINTEN-
TIONAL TORTS. 
Appellant asks this Court not to distinguish between inten-
tional and unintentional torts for purposes of interspousal 
immunity. Such a contention clearly ignores the strong policy 
and familial reasons for drawing such a distinction and apply-
ing different and appropriate standards accordingly. 
The following discussion sets forth five policy reasons 
that distinguish between intentional and unintentional torts 
and support retention of interspousal immunity for uninten-
tional torts. Those policy reasons are as follows: 
1. Promotion of marital harmony; 
2. Prevention of collusive lawsuit; 
3. Avoidance of rewarding defendant spouse for his 
or her own wrongdoing; 
4. Avoidance of the possibility of trivial or 
spurious lawsuits between spouses; and 
5. A change in public policy of the State should 
come from the Legislature. 
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1. Promotion of Marital Harmony 
A commonly advanced and practical justification for main-
taining interspousal immunity for unintentional torts is that 
such suits would create or aggravate marital discord. This 
Court has recognized that "it should be the purpose of the law 
to protect family solidarity." Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 
2d 344, 384 P.2d 389, 391 (1963). In Rubalcava, this Court 
recognized that barring negligence suits between spouses 
promotes, or at least preserves, harmony and tranquility in the 
home and allows spouses to resolve these problems in a manner 
that may enhance the marital relationship. 
This Court has recognized and discarded as unpersuasive 
arguments to the contrary. The first such argument is that 
"the wrongful act has likely impaired the marital harmony 
anyway, so the lawsuit would not extend the rift, but, if any-
thing, would tend to rectify it." Rubalcava, 384 P.2d at 389. 
This Court was not persuaded. Clearly, such an argument has 
merit in the context of the commission of an intentional tort. 
That argument, however, has no merit in and should not be 
extended to the commission of an unintentional tort. There is 
no reason to assume that an act of negligence reflects a lack 
of marital harmony. 
A second contrary argument is "that since the insurance 
company, and not the defendant, will have to pay, the family 
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exchequer will not suffer so much by allowing the action as by 
denying it, so the family harmony will not be harmed but may be 
saved by allowing the action." Id., at 390-91. Once again, 
this Court in Rubalcava rejected as unpersuasive the argument 
that domestic harmony would not be impaired or that public 
policy would be advanced by the institution of a lawsuit by the 
injured spouse in cases in which the defendant spouse is 
protected by liability insurance. Admittedly, where insurance 
coverage exists, the bringing of a lawsuit may not always 
create or substantially enhance marital discord, but there 
exists the likelihood of interspousal collusion, discussed 
infra. To the extent that marital disharmony would be reduced 
by the availability of insurance, the potential for fraud is 
increased. Where no threat of fraud exists because there is no 
insurance, the risk of marital discord is increased. As one 
court stated: 
Adversary tort lawsuits between spouses have an 
upsetting and embittering effect upon domestic tran-
quility and the marital relationship. But non-adver-
sary lawsuits that do not disturb the peace and 
harmony of the marriage encourage fraudulent and 
collusive claims, particularly where a third-party 
insurance company must pay any judgment awarded. 
Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 4 7 5 So.2d 
1211, 1212 (Fla. 1985) (quoting Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 
352, 355 (Fla. 1979), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980)). 
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A third argument against the idea that such lawsuits would 
inhibit marital harmony is that when one spouse brings a suit 
against the other, there is little marital tranquility to 
preserve. That argument is unpersuasive. Conjugal tranquility 
may have been disturbed by the instigation of the lawsuit. 
Clearly, the allegations, discovery, evidence, testimony and 
posturing required to maintain or defend successfully a negli-
gence action would create or aggravate tension and ruin an 
otherwise salvageable marriage. Where insurance exists, as 
discussed above, and the strong policy of marital tranquility 
is realized, it is unreasonable to assume that the defendant 
spouse, who continued living with the plaintiff spouse, would 
defend and assist in the defense wholeheartedly. 
2. Prevention of Collusive Lawsuits 
A strong potential for collusive lawsuits between spouses 
exists where an insurance company must defend the action and be 
the real party in interest. Three dangers exist. The first 
danger is that fraudulent or trumped-up claims will be made. 
The second danger is that even where the claims are not 
trumped-up, where the marriage is harmonious, the offending 
spouse will not defend the action zealously. The third danger, 
as discussed above, is that where the offending spouse does 
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defend zealously or wholeheartedly, as he or she should, ten-
sion and discord will arise. This Court in Rubalcava discarded 
any argument to the contrary. 384 P.2d at 390-91. 
The contention that courts are capable of weeding out 
fraudulent claims has been addressed and rejected by many 
courts. As one court stated: 
We expect too much of human nature if we believe that 
a husband and wife who sleep in the same bed, eat at 
the same table, and spend money from the same purse 
can be truly adversary to each other Ln a lawsuit when 
any judgment obtained by the plaintiff spouse will be 
paid by an insurance company and will ultimately 
benefit both spouses. . . . 
Furthermore, [these cases are] akin to the 
dangerously prevalent view that such payments are free 
if the insurance company pays for it. Of course, 
someone, and us all, must pay insurance premiums which 
are determined on the basis of risks and losses 
incurred. 
Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 4 75 So.2d 
1211, 1213 (Fla. 1985) (quoting Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 
352, 355 (Fla. 1979), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980)). See 
also Green v. Green, 4 Ohio App. 3d 133, 446 N.E.2d 837, 838 
(1982) ("The immunity prevents fraud and collusion at the 
expense of tactically disadvantaged insurance companies"); 
Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E. 2d 533 (1965), 
aff'd in Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 269, 383 N.E. 2d 888 
(1978) ("It is argued that the task of weeding out fraudulent 
or collusive suits is properly within the sphere of Courts and 
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juries. In truly adversary cases, fraud is likely to be 
uncovered because of the desire of the defendant to avoid the 
loss. Where insurance is involved, the risk of loss is 
removed, and both spouses stand to gain from a decision adverse 
to the defendant. This creates a strong inducement to trump up 
claims and conceal possible defenses"); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 
286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955) ("We revere the jury system as the 
bulwark of individual liberty, but we are also realists, and we 
know that juries are, as a Kentucky mountaineer once 
said - 'tolerable generous with other people's money, 
especially when the aroma of insurance permeates the court-
room' ") . 
Although insurance companies may be able to protect them-
selves against fraudulent claims by excluding spousal coverage 
in the policy itself (contractual interspousal immunity) or by 
increasing insurance rates to offset the cost of fraudulent 
claims (overall subsidization of the cost of collusive inter-
spousal claims), public policy and familial relationships are 
not enhanced by these alternatives. 
3. Avoidance of Rewarding Defendant Spouse for His or Her 
Own Wrongdoing 
Public policy encourages and should encourage spouses to 
cohabit and work out their differences. Where one spouse 
obtains a Court judgment against the other spouse but they 
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continue to cohabit, it is reasonable to assume that the 
tort-feasor would share in the benefits of an award paid by the 
defendant spouse's insurance company. Burns v. Burns, 111 
Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717, 719 (1974). Snowten v. United States 
Fidelity 8c Guaranty Co., 475 So.2d 1211, 1213 (Fla. 1985) 
(citing Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979), cert 
denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980)). Public policy should disfavor a 
wrongdoer benefitting from his tortious conduct. 
4. Avoidance of the Possibility of Trivial or Spurious 
Lawsuits Between Spouses 
Marriage relationships are unusual in the sense that 
partners are intimate emotionally, psychologically and 
physically. The marriage relationship should be conducive to 
openness, compromise, adjustment and tolerance. People in 
marriage let down their guards, as it should be. Because of 
the individual differences and idiosyncrasies spouses bring to 
their marriage, potential for conflict, tension and careless-
ness exists. Despite the potential for collusive lawsuits, 
abolition of interspousal immunity for unintentional torts 
could lead to petty, trivial or spurious lawsuits between 
spouses. One can envision countless scenarios where conduct 
between non-spouses would be considered tortious but should not 
be considered tortious as between spouses. Some examples might 
include shoveling the walks, waxing the floor, taking out the 
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garbage, caring for children, unsatisfactory completion of 
other household duties and chores that cause injury, contra-
ceptive use or sexual proclivity. See Moore, The Case for 
Retention of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 7 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 943 
passum (1980) (giving examples of petty lawsuits that have been 
filed and examples of foreseeable lawsuits). Regardless of 
whether abrogating spousal immunity for unintentional torts 
would result in a rash of these lawsuits, a significant 
question before the Court is whether the door even should be 
opened to allow the potential for these suits or whether public 
policy should continue to encourage spouses to resolve these 
problems in ways more susceptible of mending familial relation-
ships. The abrogation of interspousal immunity for uninten-
tional torts could result in unwarranted intrafamilial 
litigation. 
5. A Change in Public Policy of the State Should Come 
From the Legislature 
The abolition of interspousal immunity for unintentional 
torts would constitute a radical departure from public policy 
and traditional practice. The desirability of such a change is 
debatable at best. Any such modification of public policy and 
the law should be left to legislative discretion. As one Court 
stated: 
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As to tort law, elimination of the doctrine could 
. . . open up a possibility of tort actions . . . that 
could go to the heart of public policy and legislative 
policy relating to marriage. . . . [T]he problem is 
more appropriate for legislative solution than for 
judicial determination. The General Assembly has 
access to relevant information bearing upon these 
matters more significant than afforded this 
Court. . . . 
Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 162-63 (Del. 1979), appeal 
dismissed, 446 U.S. 931 (1980). See also Rubalcava v. 
Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389, 393 (1963) ("We are of 
the opinion that under the circumstances, in fairness to those 
who have relied thereon, and in proper deference to the 
solidarity of the law, any change could be justified only to 
correct patent error, otherwise it should be made by the legis-
lature, plainly so declaring, so that all may be advised what 
the change is and when it will be effective") (emphasis added); 
Robeson v. International Indemnity Co., 282 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. 
1981) ("it is a rather close question as to whether abrogation 
of the doctrine at this juncture would be a proper exercise of 
judicial authority. Although it is true that the doctrine is 
of common-law origin, it is of long-standing application; and 
it is not unrealistic to presume that people have come to rely 
on it. In addition, it is the General Assembly and not this 
court that possesses the resources for determining the 
viability of the various policy considerations. On matters 
such as whether husbands and wives should be allowed to sue 
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each other in tort, the expressions of public policy should 
come from the legislative branch") (citing Rubalcava v. 
Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963)); Green v. Green, 
4 Ohio App. 3d 133, 446 N.E. 2d 837, 838 (Ohio App. 1982)("If 
there is to be change in the public policy of the state 
[regarding interspousal immunity for unintentional torts], it 
should emanate from the General Assembly") (citing Lyons v. 
Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965)); 
As one Court noted, this Court's abolition of interspousal 
immunity for intentional torts did not change public policy but 
promoted it. In Green v. Green the court stated: 
[T]he public policy considerations used to support 
interspousal immunity for negligent torts are not 
applicable to, nor are they advanced by, the imposi-
tion of interspousal immunity in the area of inten-
tional torts. We believe the ability of one spouse to 
sue the other for an intentional tort promotes the 
general public policy of providing a remedy for wrongs 
done and deterring intentional conduct such as assault 
and battery. 
446 N.E. 2d at 839. That court noted, however, that abolition 
of interspousal immunity for unintentional torts would be a 
radical change in public policy and would best be left to the 




Interspousal immunity for unintentional torts should remain 
intact for the reasons set forth above. Elimination of the 
immunity would be a radical departure from the common law and 
the strong public policy favoring the maintenance of familial 
relationships. Inroads into familial and marital solidarity 
should be resisted. > 
DATED this j g ^ f day of November, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
SCM1952T 
Raymond M. Berry 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Respondent 
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